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THE SCOPE OF COMPARATIVE FAULT IN MINNESOTA
As Minnesota sheds the shackles of traditional torts, it experiments with dissolving
all distinctions between causes of actions such as torts, both intentional and unin-
tentional, stnct liability, absolute liability, and contract. The Minnesota Compar-
ative Fault Act marks a major move toward the single, multipurpose cause of
action. This Note identifies what has already been subsumed under the Act, what
has been excluded, and what factors might guide future inclusions.
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 299
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT ............................. 300
A. Contrbutoy Negligence .................................. 300
B. Comparative Negligence ................................. 301
C Types of Comparative Negligence and Fault ................ 303
1 Comparative Negligence Generally ..................... 303
2. Slight/Gross Comparative Negligence .................. 304
3. Modifed Comparative Negligence ...................... 305
4. Pure Comparative Negligence ......................... 306
5 Comparative Fault .................................. 306
a. Generally ....................................... 306
b. Modified Comparative Fault ....................... 307
c. Pure Comparative Fault ........................... 307
III. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE FAULT IN MINNESOTA.. 308
A. Contributory Negligence .................................. 308
B. Comparative Negligence ................................. 310
C Comparative Fault ...................................... 312
IV. MINNESOTA COMPARATIVE FAULT CASES ................. 313
A. Seim v. Garavalia .................................... 313
B. Peterson v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc ................. 314
C Lesm eister v. Dilly .................................... 316
V . A NALYSIS ................................................. 317
A . Fairness ............................................... 318
B. Legal Scholars ......................................... 318
C Pre-Comparative Fault Cases ............................. 318
D. UCFA Comments ...................................... 319
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................. 323
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the scope of contributory negligence was limited.'
Courts applied the common law contributory negligence doctrine to
I. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 416 (4th ed. 1971).
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traditional negligence torts but rarely beyond.2 Even then, scholars criti-
cized 3 while courts and juries avoided the doctrine whenever possible. 4
In 1969, Minnesota abandoned contributory negligence with the
adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act. 5 The Minnesota Supreme
Court defined negligence as "a departure from a standard of conduct
required by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk
of harm." 6 In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature amended the 1969 Act,7
changing the comparative negligence statute to a comparative fault
statute.8
Since fault is a broader concept than negligence, the comparative fault
statute's scope is potentially broader than the comparative negligence
statute's scope. 9 The history of comparative fault io and its development
in Minnesota" 1 demonstrate a tendency toward increasingly broader use
of the doctrine. Recent Minnesota cases show with more detail how ex-
pansively Minnesota courts will apply comparative fault.12
II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
A. Contrbutogy Negligence
Prior to the development of comparative negligence, the common law
defense of contributory negligence governed a negligent plaintiff's recov-
ery. 13 Contributory negligence originated in the English case of Butter-
field v. Forrester. 14 In Butterftield, the plaintiff, when returning from an
2. Id at 426.
3. See, e.g., Mole & Wilson, A Study OfComparative Negligence, (pts I & 2), 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 333, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 604 (1932); Gregory, Loss Dzstrbution by Comparative Negligence,
21 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1936).
4. See, e.g., Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429-30, 281 N.W. 261,
263 (1938) (the court applied contributory negligence, but with great displeasure).
5. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, §§ 1-2, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069-70 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982)).
6. Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Minn. 1981) (quoting Prosser, Contribu-
toiy Neghgence as a Defense to Violation ofa Statute, 32 MINN. L. REV. 105, 110 (1948)).
7. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6-7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982)).
8. Compare MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1970) with MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982).
9. See Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981). The court noted that "[tihe
1978 legislation significantly broadened the scope of the comparative negligence statute in
an expansive definition of the word 'fault,' which replaced the word 'negligence' in the
statute." Id. at 809; see also Steenson, The Anatomy ofPoducts Liability in Mhnnesota, 6 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 243, 335 (1980).
10. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
11. See in/ia notes 100-40 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 141-86 and accompanying text.
13. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 65, at 416.
14. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). The Butterfield opinion is often re-
ferred to as the parent of all contributory negligence cases. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS 1223 n.26 (1956).
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evening at the "public house," spurred his horse to a fast gait.15 No
sooner had the horse gotten up to speed than it stumbled over a pole
which the defendant left in the road. 16 The plaintiff flew from his horse
and landed with a bone crunching thud.' 7 The court held that the
plaintiff could not recover for he had "cast himself upon a barrier."' 8
Later courts give the Butterfield decision the broadest of readings: con-
tributory negligence came to mean that when plaintiff's negligence in
any way contributed to an accident, the plaintiff may not recover. 19
B. Comparative Negligence
Early in this century, dissatisfaction began to grow with the all-or-
nothing recovery rule of contributory negligence .20 Some legal scholars
called for its abolition in favor of comparative negligence.2I Judges criti-
cized the defense 22 and were most unwilling to find a plaintiff negligent
as a matter of law.23 A few statutes provided for comparative fault in
limited circumstances. Those statutes incorporating comparative fault
typically protected injured workers.24 The Federal Employers' Liability
Act of 1908,25 protected railroad workers; the Jones Act of 1920,26 pro-
tected seamen; state statutes protected other workers. 27 These statutes
apportioned fault according to the principles of comparative fault.2
8
Abolition of contributory negligence in all negligence actions was
longer in coming.2 9 Mississippi took the first lasting step by enacting a
pure comparative negligence statute in 1910.30 Under Mississippi's pure
15. See 11 East at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926.
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
19. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.2, at 4 (1974).
20. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 67; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4.
21. See e.g., Gregory, supra note 3; Mole and Wilson, supra note 3.
22. See, e.g., Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429, 281 N.W. 261, 263
(1938).
23. See Note, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 476 (1936).
24. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 11.
25. See Act of Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 66 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53
(1976)).
26. See Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 688
(1976)).
The Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (DOHSA) also incorporates pure compara-
tive fault principles. See Act of Mar. 30, 1920, ch. 111, § 6, 41 Stat. 537 (codified at 46
U.S.C. § 766 (1976)). While the Jones Act applied only to sailors, DOHSA applies to
anyone killed on the high seas. Likely, sailors have been the major group of DOHSA
benefit recipients but the Act does protect others.
27. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 12.
28. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 67, at 435-36.
29. See generally id.
30. See Act of Apr. 16, 1910, ch. 135, 1910 Miss. Laws 125 (current version at MISS.
1983]
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system the plaintiff's recovery was diminished by the percentage of the
plaintiff's negligence even if the plaintiff was 99% negligent he could still
recover 1% of his damages. 3' Three years later, Georgia followed Missis-
sippi's example, but by judicial decision rather than legislative action.
32
The Georgia Supreme Court expanded a statute governing railroad acci-
dents to cover all negligence actions33 and laid the groundwork for what
would become modified comparative fault. 34 The court added a require-
ment that damages be apportioned unless the plaintiff's "negligence was
equal to or greater than the negligence of the defendant." 35 In 1913,
Nebraska passed a slight/gross comparative negligence statute.36 The
plaintiff could still recover if his negligence was slight in comparison to
the gross negligence of the defendant.
37
The field of comparative negligence remained fairly dormant until the
middle of this century.38 Wisconsin passed a modified form of compara-
tive negligence in 1931.39 Under the Wisconsin statute the plaintiff
could recover if his negligence was "not as great as that of the defend-
ant."40 A 49% negligent plaintiff would recover 51% of his damages, but
a 50% negligent plaintiff would recover nothing.4' Ten years later, in
1941, South Dakota passed a slight/gross comparative negligence statute
nearly identical to Nebraska's statute.42 Comparative negligence did not
catch hold immediately but did gain a beachhead.
Several proposed comparative negligence bills were voted down by
CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)); see also Shell & Bufkin, Comparative Negligence in Mississippi,
27 Miss. L. REV. 105 (1956).
31. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972).
32. See Goodrich, Ori'gin of the Georgia Rule of Comparative Negligence and Apportionment of
Damages, 1940 GA. B.A.J. 174 cited in V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 12.
33. See Elk Cotton Mills v. Grant, 140 Ga. 727, 79 S.E. 836 (1913).
34. See Christian v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 120 Ga. 314, 47 S.E. 923 (1904); see also
infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (discussion of modified comparative negligence).
35. 120 Ga. at 317, 47 S.E. at 923 ("The first headnote [stating the 'equal to or than'
language] is sufficient without elaboration.").
36. See Act of Apr. 16, 1913, ch. 124, § 1, 1913 Neb. Laws 311 (codified at NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1151 (1975)).
37. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, §§ 2.1, 3.4.
38. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 67, at 436; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19,
§ 1.4, at 11-16.
39. See Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 242, 1931 Wis. Laws 375 (current version at Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983)). For a general discussion of the 1931 comparative
negligence act, see Whelan, Comparative Negligence, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 465.
40. Act of June 15, 1931, ch. 242, 1931 Wis. Laws 375 (current version at WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983)).
41. See id. In 1971, the Wisconsin statute was amended to allow the plaintiff to re-
cover if his negligence was "not greater than" that of the defendant. See Act of June 22,
1971, ch. 47, 197 Wis. Laws 50 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983)).
42. See Act of Mar. 13, 1941, ch. 160, 1941 S.D. Sess. Laws 184 (codified as amended
at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979)). See generally Comment, Comparative Negl-
gence: A Look at the South Dakota Approach, 14 S.D.L. REv. 92 (1969).
[Vol. 9
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state legislatures.43 The New York Assembly killed bills in 1930 and
1947. 4 4 A Michigan bill died in committee in 1947. 4 5 In Washington,
bills were introduced and voted down in every legislative session for
twenty-five years until finally, comparative negligence was adopted in
1973.46 Bills also failed in Pennsylvania47 and Oregon.48
In 1960, comparative negligence was a vastly outnumbered minority
rule;49 by the end of that decade, however, comparative negligence be-
came the majority rule. 50 Most states adopted comparative negligence
by statute, 5' while some adopted it by judicial decision.52 Most of the
states legislatively adopting comparative fault opted for a modified form;
whereas most of the states judically adopting it opted for the pure
form,53 with the result that comparative negligence is now firmly en-
trenched in American law.54
C. Types of Comparative Negligence and Fault
1. Comparative Negligence Generally
American jursidictions have spawned three forms of comparative neg-
ligence: slight/gross, 55 modified,56 and pure. 57 Only two states have en-
acted the slight/gross form: Nebraska 58 and South Dakota. 59 Modified
comparative negligence is the majority rule in the United States with
twenty-four jurisdictions in the fold.60 Ten American jurisdictions have
43. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 14.
44. Id See generally 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 458 (1947) (discussion of 1947 bill).
45. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 14.
46. See id.; see also Act of Apr. 23, 1973, ch. 138, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Extra Sess.
949, 949 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (West 1980)), repealed by Act of
Apr. 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 17, 1981 Wash. Laws 120.
47. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 14; Note, Comparative Negligence in Penn-
sylvania, 17 TEMP. L.Q. 276, 286 (1943) (discussing proposed bill).
48. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 14. See generally Haugh, Comparative
Negligence: 4 Reform Long Overdue, 49 OR. L. REV. 38 (1969) (urging adoption of compara-
tive negligence). The Oregon legislature enacted a comparative negligence statute in
1971. See Act ofJune 30, 1971, ch. 668, 1971 Or. Laws 1516 (codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.470 (1979)). See generally Comment, Comparative Negligence Legislation: Continuing Con-
troversy Over the Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk in Oregon, 53 OR. L. REV. 79 (1973).
49. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.4, at 15.
50. See id, § 1.4, at 15-16.
51. See id., § 1.5, at 17.
52. Id, § 1.5.
53. See id., § 3.2.
54. Id., § 1.1.
55. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
57. See znfra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
58. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979).
59. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979).
60. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 &
19831
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adopted pure comparative fault.6 1 Modified comparative fault has been
enacted in two states: Arkansas 62 and Minnesota.6 3 Pure comparative
fault is contemplated by the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.64
Twenty-one legislatures have decided what form of comparative negli-
gence their jurisdictions will have: twenty-five opted for either
slight/gross or a modified form; 65 only six opted for the pure form. 66 On
the other hand, six courts have decided the question for their jurisdic-
tions: only one opted for a modified system; 6 7 the other five chose pure
comparative negligence.68
2. Slight/Gross Comparative Negligence
South Dakota's and Nebraska's slight/gross systems are only a small
step away from contributory negligence. 69 A South Dakota Law Review
comment noted:
Contrary to what might logically be assumed . . . the comparative
negligence statute has not changed the law defining contributory negli-
gence . . . . The legislative purpose in enacting a comparative negli-
gence law was to benefit only that particular and very limited class of
plaintiffs in negligence cases whose contributory negligence is small in
quantum. The idea was to substitute, under these circumstances alone,
a comparative negligence theory for the unduly harsh doctrine of con-
Cum. Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Cum. Supp. 1984); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1968 & Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979); KAN. CIV. PRO.
STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Vernon Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1964);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-702 & 703
(1982); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.141 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-80); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07
(1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13 &
14 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
§ 7102 (Purdon 1982); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973 & Cum. Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (Cum. Supp. 1983-84); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (West 1983); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § I-1-109 (1983).
61. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (1975), afd, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977);
Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman
v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275
N.W.2d 511 (1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 105-603 (1968); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2316 (West 1979); MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1972); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 1411-1413 (McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4
(Cum. Supp. 1983).
62. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1764 (1979).
63. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982).
64. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 36-37 (Supp. 1984).
65. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 67, at 437.
[Vol. 9
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tributory negligence. 70
Only when the plaintiffs negligence is slight and the defendant's negli-
gence is gross can a negligent plaintiff recover.
7'
The slight/gross system was an early attempt to ameliorate the harsh-
ness of contributory negligence.72 Illinois 7 3 and Kansas 74 first experi-
mented with slight/gross systems in the late nineteenth century. Both
jurisdictions dropped the experiments because of endless appeals result-
ing from the hopeless confusion involved in defining "slight" and
"gross." 75 In the early twentieth century both Nebraska and South Da-
kota adopted slight/gross systems.
76
The tenor of the slight/gross system is that contributory negligence is a
good system, the rough edges simply need to be rounded off.77 These
rough edges are smoothed by allowing a comparative negligence alloca-
tion between the parties only under very limited circumstances. The
slight/gross system is more an affirmation on contributory negligence
than an embracing of comparative negligence. 78 Therefore, one should
not expect the slight/gross system to be used beyond traditional negli-
gence cases covered by contributory negligence.
3. Modifted Comparative Negligence
Most American jurisdictions have adopted modified comparative neg-
ligence systems.79 Modified systems are a fifty-fifty mixture comparative
negligence and contributory negligence.80 If the plaintiffs negligence
contributes less than a specific percentage, the plaintiffs recovery is di-
minished by that percentage. If the plaintiffs negligence contributes
more than the specific percentage, the plaintiff cannot recover at all.81
The specific percentage of contributory negligence is an unreasonable
figure prior to trial. In most modified comparative negligence jurisdic-
tions the plaintiff can recover only if his negligence is equal to or less
70. Comment, The Status of Comparative Negligence in South Dakota, 7 S.D.L. REV. 114,
114 (1962) (footnotes omitted).
71. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); see also Roberts v. Brown, 72 S.D.
479, 36 N.W.2d 665 (1949); Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W.2d 438 (1943).
- 72. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 67.
73. See Galena & C. U. R.R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858); see also Malone, The Forma-
tive Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REV. 151, 170 (1946).
74. See Wichita & W. R.R. v. Davis, 37 Kan. 743, 16 P. 78 (1887); Sawyer v. Sauer, 10
Kan. 466 (1872).
75. See Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Hessions, 150 11. 546, 37 N.E. 905 (1894).
76. See Johnson, Comparatie Negligence-The Nebraska View, 36 NEB. L. REV. 240
(1957); Comment, supra note 70.
77. See generally Comment, supra note 70.
78. Id
79. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
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than the defendant's negligence.82 A few jurisdictions still hold that the
plaintiff's negligence must be less than the defendant's-a fifty-fifty split
of negligence would yield no recovery.
83
Modified comparative negligence does not totally abandon contribu-
tory negligence. If the plaintiff's negligence is more than a given percent-
age, contributory negligence bars recovery; if the plaintiff's negligence is
less than that given percentage, comparative negligence principles allo-
cate the damages.84 Modified comparative negligence was enacted to
eliminate the harsh results of contributory negligence.85 Modified com-
parative negligence does, however, go a significant way toward abolition
of contributory negligence. Depending upon the jurisdiction's legislative
history and judicial attitudes toward interpretation, courts should be
freer to apply modified comparative fault to situations beyond the scope
of traditional negligence actions.
4. Pure Comparative Negligence
Eleven jurisdictions have taken the great step and totally abolished
contributory negligence.8 6 In those jurisdictions, the plaintiff's negli-
gence never bars a claim, it merely diminishes the plaintiffs recovery.8 7
A 10% negligent plaintiff will recover 90% of his damages; a 90% negli-
gent plaintiff, 10% of his damages.
Contributory negligence's abolishment alone does not mean that pure
comparative negligence will be broadly applied beyond the scope of
traditional negligence considered. Legislative and judicial intent must
be weighed. If the new law was intended only to replace contributory
negligence with comparative negligence, the new law will probably not
be extended beyond the traditional negligence field. If, however, the law




Comparative fault is a relatively recent development, with its begin-
nings in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA).88 At present only
82. See id
83. Id see also Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706
(1973) (plaintiff and two defendants were each 1/3 negligent, therefore plaintiff recovered
nothing).
84. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Cady, Alas and A/ack, Modifted Comparative Negligence Comes to West Vir-
ginza, 82 W, VA. L. REV. 473, 490-91 (1980).
86. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
87. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 2.1, at 32.
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two states have adopted comparative fault: Minnesota8 9 and Arkansas. 90
"Fault" is potentially a broader category than "negligence."91 UCFA
defines fault as:
acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward
the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to
strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty unrea-
sonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express con-
sent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be
liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate dam-
ages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the
basis for liability and to contributory fault.
9 2
The definition itself speaks of application beyond traditional negligence.
b. Modified Comparative Fault
Both Arkansas' and Minnesota's comparative fault statutes are based
upon a modified system.9 3 If the plaintiff's fault contributed equally or
less than the defendant's fault, the plaintiff's recovery is diminished by
his percentage of fault. If the plaintiffs fault is greater than the defend-
ant's fault, the plaintiff cannot recover.94 The only difference between
the Minnesota and Arkansas statutes and, the majority of other compar-
ative negligence statutes, is that fault is compared not negligence.
95
Since "fault" may be potentially broader than negligence, the Minnesota
and Arkansas statutes could easily be applied far beyond traditional neg-
ligence actions.
c. Pure Comparative Fault
Pure comparative fault has never been enacted by any state.9 6 UCFA
contemplates a pure system, and defines fault much broader than tradi-
tional negligence.97 The Act, however, does not profess to be a compre-
89. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982).
90. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1764 (1979).
91. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 2.2, at 35-36.
92. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I(b), 12 U.L.A. 36-37 (Supp. 1984).
93. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1764 (1979); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1980); see also V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 2.2.
94. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1765 (1979); MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1982).
95. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 2.2, at 35-36. Although Arkansas uses fault
instead of negligence, fault is broadly defined to include negligence, willful and wanton
conduct, supplying of a defective product in an unreasonably dangerous condition, or any
other act or omission or conduct actionable in tort. Id.
Unlike both Minnesota and Arkansas, most jurisdictions are comparative negligence
states. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
96. See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 2.1. Pure comparative negligence,
however, has been enacted in several states including Florida, Mississippi, Rhode Island,
and Washington. Id.
97. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 36-37 (Supp. 1984). The
Act also includes acts or omissions that are reckless or that subject a person to strict tort
1983]
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hensive loss allocation scheme, 98 although it invites extention of its
principles as broadly as a court sees fit. Potentially, a court could apply
the principles of comparative fault as a broadly based loss allocation
scheme. 99
III. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE FAULT IN MINNESOTA
A. Contributory Negligence
Early in its statehood, Minnesota adopted contributory negligence.
According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, in City of St. Paul v. Kuby, 100
"it was for the Defendant to show, by way of defence, that negligence on
the part of the Plaintiff concurred in producing the result."10 The Kuby
court, thus adopted the contributory negligence doctrine.10 2 In the next
few years, the court repeatedly upheld contributory negligence as a de-
fense.1O 3 By the turn of the century, the defense was a doctrine.
Contributory negligence had two elements:1o 4 a plaintiff's want of or-
dinary care and causation.05 The court spoke of want of ordinary care
in normal negligence terms. The plaintiff need not have knowledge and
willingness to encounter the danger.1o 6 Causation means not a slight
cause, but the probable cause of the injury. 10 7 The doctrine was applied,
however, only to tort claims.108 The tort plaintiff whose lack of ordinary
liability. Further the Act includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk
not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the defend-
ant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. Id
98. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
The scope of this Act is confined to physical harm to person or property. It does not
include economic loss resulting from torts such as negligent misrepresentation, defama-
tion, or interference with contractual relations. Id
99. Id Failure to include harms outside the scope of this Act does not preclude their
application should a court determine them applicable under the state's common law. Id
100. 8 Minn. 154, 8 Gil. 125 (1862).
101. Id at 164, 8 Gil. at 135.
102. See id.
103. Eg., Tvedt v. Wheeler, 70 Minn. 161, 72 N.W. 1062 (1897); Carroll v. Minnesota
Valley R.R., 14 Minn. 57, 14 Gil. 42 (1869); Schell v. Second Nat'l Bank, 14 Minn. 43, 14
Gil. 34 (1869); Johnson v. Winona & St. P. R.R., 11 Minn. 296, 11 Gil. 204 (1865).
104. See Fitzgerald v. International Flax Twine Co., 104 Minn. 138, 149, 116 N.W.
475, 479 (1908).
105. See Cormican v. Parsons, 282 Minn. 94, 163 N.W.2d 41 (1968); Hacker v.
Berkner, 263 Minn. 278, 117 N.W.2d 13 (1962); Fitzgerald v. International Flax Twine
Co., 104 Minn. 138, 116 N.W. 475 (1908).
106. See Knutson v. Arrigoni Bros. Co., 275 Minn. 408, 413, 147 N.W.2d 561, 565-66
(1966).
107. See Carlson v. Naddy, 181 Minn. 180, 232 N.W. 3 (1930); Blume v. Chicago, M. &
St. P. Ry., 133 Minn. 348, 158 N.W. 418 (1916).
108. See, e.g., Shafer v. Gaylord, 287 Minn. 1, 176 N.W.2d 745 (1970) (traffic accident);
Martz v. Revier, 284 Minn. 166, 170 N.W.2d 83 (1969) (traffic accident); Cormican v.
Parsons, 282 Minn. 94, 163 N.W.2d 41 (1968) (traffic accident); Mourning v. Interlachen
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care proximately caused his injury was barred from any recovery.' 0 9
Contributory negligence had its critics in Minnesota.I 10 In fact, judi-
cial antagonism produced a host of exceptions for circumventing the doc-
trine:III the emergency rule,12 the rescue doctrine,'j 3 the discovered
Country Club, 280 Minn. 94, 158 N.W.2d 244 (1968) ("step in the dark"); Stephenson v.
F.W. Woolworth Co., 277 Minn. 190, 152 N.W.2d 138 (1967) (slip and fall); Rausch v.
Julius B. Nelson & Sons, Inc., 276 Minn. 12, 149 N.W.2d 1 (1967) (wrongful death); Knut-
son v. Arrigoni Bros. Co., 275 Minn. 408, 147 N.W.2d 561 (1966) (personal injury);
Hacker v. Berkner, 263 Minn. 278, 117 N.W.2d 13 (1962) (personal injury, products liabil-
ity); Carlson v. Naddy, 181 Minn. 180, 232 N.W. 3 (1930) (traffic accident); Anderson v.
David, 151 Minn. 454, 187 N.W. 224 (1922) (automobile and train collision); Blume v.
Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 133 Minn. 348, 158 N.W. 418 (1916) (personal injury on train);
Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 137 N.W. 12 (1912) (personal injury in
iron mine); Fitzgerald v. International Flax Twine Co., 104 Minn. 138, 116 N.W. 475
(1908) (personal injury while spinning flax); Tvedt v. Wheeler, 70 Minn. 161, 72 N.W.
1062 (1897) (failure to fence wheel hole); Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81, 14 Gil. 62
(1869) (horse and buggy accident); Carroll v. Minnesota Valley R.R., 14 Minn. 57, 14 Gil.
42 (1869) (personal injury on railroad); Schell v. Second Nat'l Bank, 14 Minn. 43, 14 Gil.
34 (1869) (negligent care of wall).
109. See Martz v. Revier, 284 Minn. 166, 170 N.W.2d 83 (1969); Carlson v. Naddy,
181 Minn. 180, 232 N.W. 3 (1930); Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81, 14 Gil. 62 (1869).
110. Justice Holt of the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that:
No one can appreciate more than we the hard- ship of depriving plaintiff of
his verdict and of all right to collect damages from defendant; but the rule of
contributory negligence, through no fault of ours, remains in our law and gives
us no alternative other than to hold that defendant is entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. It would be hard to imagine a case more illustra-
tive of the truth that in operation the rule of comparative negligence would serve
justice more faithfully than that of contributory negligence. We but blind our
eyes to obvious reality to the extent that we ignore the fact that in many cases
juries apply it in spite of us. But as long as the legislature refuses to substitute
the rule of comparative for that of contributory negligence we have no option
but to enforce the law in a proper case. We cannot escape the conclusion that
this case compels its application.
Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 429-30, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
William Prosser has long opposed contributory negligence. See Prosser, Comparative
Neg'igence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1953).
111. See Lowndes, Contributoy Neghgence, 22 GEo. L.J. 674 (1934). Prof. Lowndes notes
that:
Liability in Torts is frequently more sentimental than rational. If anyone be
shocked at this thesis let him cast a criti.:al eye at what has happened to the
doctrine of contributory negligence. This tall timber in the legal jungle has been
whittled down to toothpick size by the sympathetic sabotage of juries, whose
inability to perceive contributory negligence in suits against certain defendants is
notorious; by the emotional antagonism of judges who have placed constrictions
upon the doctrine which suggest the more evident purpose to destroy it entirely,
rather than to attempt any logical limitation; by the popular prejudices of legis-
lators who have pulled the teeth of the common-law dogma or damned it
outright.
Id at 674; see also Note, supra note 23, at 481-82.
Juries as well have been antagonistic to contributory negligence. As Justice Holt
noted, "We but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the extent that we ignore the fact that
in many cases juries apply it [apportionment] in spite of us." Haeg v. Sprague, Warner &
Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263 (1938).
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peril doctrine,1 14 and the last clear chance rule.15 Only two doctrines
seemed to affirm contributory negligence and then only tangentially: the
step in the dark rule 116 and rescue of property as an exception under the
rescue doctrine." 1
7
Though not well loved, contributory negligence was firmly established
in Minnesota. Courts believed themselves unable to change the doc-
trinellS so they applied it narrowly, with many exceptions, to tort
actions.
B. Comparative Neglgence
After nearly a century of contributory negligence, the 1969 Minnesota
Legislature heeded the calls of scholars and jurists by passing the Com-
parative Negligence Act." l9 The legislature modeled its statute after
Wisconsin's statute.120 Thus, Minnesota adopted a modified compara-
tive negligence scheme. 12 1 Originally contributory negligence did not
bar recovery if the plaintiff's negligence was less than the defendant's.
22
112. See Martelle v. Thompson, 283 Minn. 279, 167 N.W.2d 376 (1969) (no real emer-
gency situation but recognized rule); Hacker v. Berkner, 263 Minn. 278, 117 N.W.2d 13
(1962) (not applied because plaintiff's negligence caused peril but recognizes rule); Ander-
son v. Davis, 151 Minn. 454, 187 N.W. 224 (1922).
113. See Shafer v. Gaylord, 287 Minn. 1, 176 N.W.2d 745 (1970); Perpich v. Leetonia
Mining Co., 118 Minn. 508, 137 N.W. 12 (1912).
114. See Koval v. Thompson, 272 Minn. 53, 136 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
115. See Gardner v. Germain, 264 Minn. 61, 117 N.W.2d 759 (1962) (elements: 1. de-
fendant aware of plaintiff's negligence, 2. reasonable opportunity to avoid, 3. does not
avoid).
116. See Conroy v. Kleinman Realty Co., 288 Minn. 61, 179 N.W.2d 162 (1970);
Lyman v. Recreational Activities, Inc., 286 Minn. 308, 175 N.W.2d 498 (1970); Mourning
v. Interlachen Country Club, 280 Minn. 94, 158 N.W.2d 244 (1968).
117. See, e.g., Berg v. Great Northern Ry., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N.W. 648 (1897).
118. Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261 (1938). Justice
Holt notes that "[a]s long as the legislature refuses to substitute the rule of comparative for
that of contributory negligence we have no option but to enforce the law in a proper
case." Id. at 430, 281 N.W. at 263.
Many courts have agreed with Justice Holt that substituting comparative for contrib-
utory negligence is a legislative rather than judicial perogative. Many scholars disagree.
See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, § 1.5. Since contributory negligence was judi-
cially adopted, judicial abrogation seems in order. Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme
Court clearly waited for the legislature to abolish contributory negligence.
119. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1982)).
120. Compare WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (1983) wtlh MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1969); see also,
Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 393 (Minn. 1977) (court recognizes Wiscon-
sin origins); Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 244, 207 N.W.2d 706,
708 (1973) (court recognizes Wisconsin origins).
121. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
122. Under this wording when the plaintiff's negligence is equal to the defendant's
negligence the plaintiff is barred from recovery. See Marier v. Memorial Rescue Serv.,
Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (1973) (plaintiff's negligence: 1/3; defendant no. 1: '/3;
defendant no. 2: 1/3-plaintiff recovers nothing).
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This was later amended to provide recovery if the plaintiff's negligence
was not greater than the defendant's negligence.123 The statute became
effective on July 1, 1969.124
Comparative negligence has been more broadly applied than contrib-
utory negligence.125 On its face, the Minnesota statute applied only to
negligence actions.126 The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the stat-
ute, however, to a number of causes of action not traditionally within the
scope of negligence: strict liability,127 assumption of the risk, 128 nonab-
solute statutory liability,129 and wrongful death actions.1
3 o
The broadening of comparative negligence's scope is not surprising.
Antagonism to contributory negligence caused judges to apply it nar-
123. Under this wording, when the plaintiffs and defendant's negligence are equal the
plaintiff can still recover.
124. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069. Under the
Act:
Section 1. [604.01] COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE; EFFECT. Subdivision I. SCOPE OF APPLICATION. Contributory negli-
gence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury
to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the
person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be di-
minished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the per-
son recovering. The court may, and when requested by either party shall, direct
the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages
and the percentage of negligence attributable to each party; and the court shall
then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to the person recovering. When there are two or more persons
who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion to the per-
centage of negligence attributable to each, provided, however, that each shall
remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.
Id
125. See generally C. HErr & C. HErr, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1978).
Heft and Heft note that:
It would be practically impossible to list all areas of the law to which com-
parative negligence principles have been applied. The numerous instances of its
application support the thesis that the comparative negligence concept is con-
stant, of uniform and universal potential application, and that it consistently
provides a procedure whereby each tortfeasor bears the burden of compensation
for damages or injury occurring as a result of that tortfeasor's own fault.
Id at § 1.100.
126. See supra note 124.
127. See Jack Frost Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346 (Minn.
1981); Leskey v. Heath Eng'g Co., 293 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1980) (products liability); Busch
v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
128. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971) (secondary
assumption of risk is comparable fault); see also Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d
167 (Minn. 1980); Parks v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 289 N.W.2d 456 (Minn. 1979) (failure to
abide by instructions); Bakhos v. Driver, 275 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 1979). But see Arm-
strong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979) (primary assumption of risk still a sepa-
rate defense).
129. See Scott v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, 256 N.W.2d 485, 488-89 (Minn.
1977).
130. See Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461 (Minn. 1977).
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rowly,131 as they have done with another much-hated doctrine, the stat-
ute of frauds.'3 2 Comparative negligence seemed a fairer way to
apportion damages. Thus, judges were not reluctant to use comparative
negligence.
C. Comparative Fault
The 1978 legislature decided to tinker with Minnesota's comparative
negligence statute. The legislature changed the statute to a comparative
fault statute 133 and adopted UCFA's definition of fault. 134 In Minne-
sota, comparative fault now includes:
acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward
the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to
strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unrea-
sonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, misuse
of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. 135
Potentially, the scope of comparative fault is even broader than that of
comparative negligence. The terms themselves point to fault including
negligence as well as other blameworthy acts. 136 The UCFA comments
note that, "[tihe Act applies to . . .the traditional action for negligence
but covers all negligent conduct, whether it comes within the traditional
131. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
132. See generally J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19-1, at 673-
74 (2d ed. 1977).
133. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1982)). The session law shows the changes:
604.01 COMPARATIVE FAULT; EFFECT. Subdivision 1. SCOPE OF APPLICATION.
Contributory [negligence]fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any person
or his legal representative to recover damages for [negligence]fault resulting in
death or in injury to person or property, if [such negligence] the contributory fault
was not [as great as] greater than the [negligence of the person]fault of the person
against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished
in [the] proportion to the amount of [negligence]fault attributable to the person
recovering. The court may, and when requested by [either] any party shall, di-
rect the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of dam-
ages and the percentage of [negligence]fault attributable to each party; and the
court shall then reduce the amount of [such] damages in proportion to the
amount of [negligence]fault attributable to the person recovering. [When there
are two or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be
in proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to each, provided,
however, that each shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award.]
Id.
134. Compare Act of Apr. 5, ch. 738, § 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 840 (codified as MINN.
STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1982)) with UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A.
36-37 (Supp. 1984); see also Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. 1981) (Minne-
sota Supreme Court recognizes UCFA as the legislature's model).
135. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1982).
136. "Fault" is defined as:
Negligence; an error or defect of judgment or of conduct; any deviation from
prudence, duty, or rectitude; any shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance
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negligence action or not."1 37 Professor Steenson agrees, noting that the
Minnesota Act, although consistent with previous cases expanding com-
parative negligence, expands the definition of apportionable plaintiff
misconduct.138 The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in Sezr v.
Garavah'a 139 that "[t]he 1978 legislation significantly broadened the scope
of the comparative negligence statute in an expansive definition of the
word 'fault,' which replaced the word 'negligence,' in the statute."140
The fairness of apportioning fault in negligence cases has been widely
recognized. These considerations of fairness have prompted courts and
legislatures to expand the scope of comparison beyond traditional negli-
gence. The next logical step then would seem to be comparing fault in-
stead of just negligence. Minnesota has taken that logical step.
IV. MINNESOTA COMPARATIVE FAULT CASES
After the Minnesota legislature adopted comparative fault, the courts
faced the task of interpreting the meaning of "comparable fault." The
Minnesota Supreme Court has had three opportunities to deal with the
issue.
A. Seim v. Garavalia
In Setm v. Garavalia, 141 little Shanon Marie Seim visited a neighbor,
Scott Garavalia. The Garavalias owned a dog named Hollow. Hollow
had never bitten anyone before but when Shanon petted him, he
knocked her over and bit her face. Permanent scarring resulted. 142
resulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversion; a wrong tendency, course or
act; bad faith or mismanagement; neglect of duty.
The word "fault" connotes an act to which blame, censure, impropriety,
shortcoming or culpability attaches.
Wrongful act, omission or breach.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 548 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
"Negligence" is defined in part as:
The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those ordi-
nary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do.
Negligence is the failure to use such care as a reasonably prudent and care-
ful person would use under similar circumstances; it is the doing of some act
which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under similar circum-
stances or failure to do what a person of ordinary prudence would have done
under similar circumstances. . . . Conduct which falls below the standard es-
tablished by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm; it
is a departure from the conduct expectable of a reasonably prudent person under
like circumstances.
Id at 930-31 (citations omitted).
137. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
138. See Steenson, supra note 9, at 335.
139. 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981).
140. Id at 809.
141. 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981).
142. See id at 808.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court faced the question of whether compar-
ative fault applied to statutorily imposed liability.143 Noting that the
scope of comparative fault is broader than that of comparative negli-
gence, the court examined the types of liability imposed by statutes:
Negligence per se, strict liability, and absolute liability.144 Negligence per
se is ordinary negligence established by violation of a statutory standard
of care. 14 5 Negligence per se was subject to contributory negligence,146
and therefore, also subject to comparative fault. 14 7 Statutes may also
create strict liability and strict liability was formerly comparable negli-
gence. 148 Absolute liability statutes are, however, an exceptional class of
statutes which were not subject to contributory negligence. 149 According
to the UCFA, absolute liability statutes are not subject to comparative
fault either.150 Whether a statute imposes liability is a matter of specific
legislative intent,151 therefore, the comparative fault act does not abolish
absolute liability. 15
2
Minnesota's dog bite statute provides that "[i]f a dog, without provo-
cation, attacks or injures any person who is . . .in any place where he
may lawfully be, the owner of the dog is liable in damages . . .to the full
amount of the injury sustained."1 53 This statute creates absolute liability
except for the statutory exceptions of provocation and trespass. 154 Sha-
non, guilty of neither provocation nor trespass, was entitled to full recov-
ery because comparative fault did not apply to statutorily created
absolute liability.155
B. Peterson v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc.
In Peterson v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc., 156 Florence Peterson purchased
143. Id at 809.
144. Id. at 810.
145. Id; see also Prosser, supra note 6, at 110.
146. See Sein, 306 N.W.2d at 810; see also Scott v. Independent School Dist. No. 709,
256 N.W.2d 485, 488-89 (Minn. 1977).
147. See Seim, 306 N.W.2d at 810.
148. Id at 810; see aLso Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
149. Seim, 306 N.W.2d at 811; see also Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d
555 (1947).
150. Sebn, 306 N.W.2d at 812; see also UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I comment,
12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
151. See Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
152. Seim, 306 N.W.2d at 812. The court noted that, "[o]ur application of the absolute
liability doctrine during this era of comparative fault recognizes the principle that the
legislative body that enacted the comparative fault statute has the authority to carve out
or preserve exceptions to the statute in the interest of public policy." Id. at 812-13.
153. MINN. STAT. § 347.22 (1982) (emphasis added).
154. Seim, 306 N.W.2d at 812. An interesting question is whether the statutory excep-
tions are total bars to recovery or simply comparable fault.
155. Id. at 813.
156. 318 N.W.2d 50 (Minn. 1982).
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a new mobile home. 157 She moved into the mobile home but was even-
tually driven out by a strong odor which caused a facial rash, burning
eyes, irritated throat, and persistent cough.158 Peterson sued on a
number of theories including breach of warranty.159 The jury found Pe-
terson 75% at fault and Bendix only 25% at fault.' 6 0 Peterson would be
barred from recovering on any claim to which comparative fault applied.
The court faced the question of how comparative fault applies to
breaches of warranty. Noting that warranties involve an amalgam of
tort and contract law, the court divided Peterson's warranty claim into
its tort and contract parts: 16 1 her claim for personal injuries as conse-
quential damages was tort-like; her claim for defects in the mobile home
as general damages and miscellaneous incidental damages was contract-
like. 162
In examining Peterson's tort like claim for consequential damages, the
court noted that contributory negligence was a bar to consequential
damages.163 Likewise, a plaintiffs comparative negligence could reduce
his consequential damages. 164 The inclusion of "breach of warranty" in
the comparative fault statute's definition of "fault" makes it clear that
the statute applies at least to consequential damages in a breach of war-
ranty.165 Thus, the court concluded that Peterson could not recover for
her personal injuries.166
Examining the contract-like claims, on the other hand, the court did
not find any reason to apply comparative fault. Prior cases had not ap-
plied contributory negligence to non-consequential damages in a war-
ranty claim.167 The UCFA comments note that there is "no intent to
include in the coverage of the Act actions that are fully contractual in
their gravamen and in which the plaintiff is suing solely because he did
not receive what he contracted to receive."168 The court noted legal
scholars were in agreement. 169
157. See id. at 51.
158. Id. at 52.




162. Id at 53.
163. Id; see also Gardner v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 511, 127 N.W.2d
557, 562 (1964).
164. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 53; see also Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266
N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn. 1978).
165. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 53; see also MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1982).
166. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 52.
167. Id. at 53; see also Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 450, 72 N.W.2d 861, 865
(1955); Razey v. J.B. Colt Co., 106 App. Div. 103, 106, 94 N.Y.S. 59, 61 (1905).
168. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984); see
Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 54.
169. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 54; see also Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Aecting the Extent
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Peterson's claim for general damages for receiving a defective mobile
home included "the difference at the time and place of acceptance be-
tween the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have
had if they had been as warranted."170 The fact that she stayed in the
mobile home longer than she should have has no relation to the mobile
home's value. 17 t Comparative fault was irrelevant to her claim for gen-
eral damages. Therefore, she recovered her entire general damages
award. 1 72  Peterson's incidental damages were, likewise, contract
claims.17 3 Comparative fault being irrelevant, she recovered her entire
incidental damages award.174
C Lesmeister v. Dilly
In Lesmeister v. Dilly, 175 Jack Lesmeister contracted for construction of
a corn storage shed on his farm. Through a comedy of errors and with
"help" from Keystone Cops construction crews, partially directed by Les-
meister himself, the shed was finished late and incorrectly. Lesmeister
sued several defendants for breach of contract and negligence in per-
formance.' 76 As part of a long special verdict form, the trial judge al-
lowed the jury to apportion fault among the parties. 1
77
of Manufacturer's Liabih'ty in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627, 651 (1968); Steenson, supra
note 9, at 338.
170. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 54 n.2 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 336.2-714(2) (1982)).
171. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 55.
172. Id at 55-56.
173. Id at 54.
174. Id at 55-56.
175. 330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983). Although the precedential value of Lesmeister is
somewhat in question, see Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 100, the court's statements regarding
the breadth of the definition of "fault" under the Minnesota comparative fault statute, the
assertion of a negligent contract cause of action, and the mitigation of damages as "fault"
are instructive.
176. Id at 97-100. Lesmeister helped to construct the foundation, dumped 38,000
bushels of corn on the foundation impeding construction of the building, and requested a
change in procedure that made waterproofing the building impossible. Id
177. Id The special verdict form was worded as follows:
If you have found that two or more of the parties - Monarch, Dilly, Atlantic,
Brown or Lesmeister, to have breached a contract, or were negligent, or
breached a warranty, and that such breach or negligence was a direct cause of
damage to Lesmeister, then answer the following question:
Taking the combined fault that contributed as a direct cause of damage to
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On appeal, the court had to decide if comparative fault applied to
contract actions and in particular, negligent breaches of contract. As a
general proposition, the court determined that comparative fault does
not apply to contract actions. Contract law has never spoken in terms of
fault and the UCFA comments indicate that there was no intent to in-
clude contract claims under the Act.'
78
Nor does the Minnesota Act apply to negligent breaches of contract.' 79
The idea that a separate action for a negligent breach of contract existed
in Minnesota derives from Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Thorsen & Thorshov,
Inc. 180 In an attempt to clarify, the court ruled that Northern Petrochemical
announced only a rule of damages, not a separate cause of action. Since
the gravamen of the case is contractual, comparative fault cannot be ap-
plied wholesale. 18'
In awarding damages, however, the Lesmeister court found a place for
comparative fault. The court awarded consequential damages to Les-
meister. 18 2 He was, however, under a duty to mitigate those damages.'8 3
Unreasonable failure to mitigate damages is apportionable under com-
parative fault.184 Since Lesmeister was partially to blame for his losses,
the court looked upon the jury verdict as failure to mitigate rather than
negligence.185 Lesmeister's consequential damages were reduced by his
percentage of fault. 186
V. ANALYSIS
The Minnesota Supreme Court has clearly recognized that the scope
of comparative fault is broader than that of comparative negligence.
The Sei'm court said as much. ' 8 7 The court in Lesmeister applied the stat-
ute beyond comparative negligence's previous scope: to unreasonable
failure to mitigate damages.18 8 The extent of comparative fault's scope
178. Id. at 101-02. The court cited the same language in the UCFA comments that it
cited in Peterson. "There is no intent to include in the coverage of the Act actions that are
fully contractual in their gravamen and in which the plaintiff is suing solely because he
did not recover what he contracted to receive." Id. (quoting UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT
ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984)); see also supra note 168 and accompanying
text.
179. See Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 102.
180. 297 Minn. 118, 211 N.W.2d 159 (1973).
181. See Lesmeirter, 330 N.W.2d at 102.
182. Id. The measure of damages was, "either the cost of reconstruction in accordance
with the contract, if this is possible without unreasonable economic waste, or the differ-
ence in the value of the building as contracted for and the value as actually built, if
reconstruction would constitute unreasonable waste." Id
183. Id. at 103.
184. Id; see a/so MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1(a) (1982).
185. Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 103.
186. Id. at 104.
187. See Seim, 306 N.W.2d at 809. See generally Steenson, supra note 9, at 335.
188. See Lesmez~rter, 330 N.W.2d at 103-04.
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remains, however, an open question. Looking at the factors analyzed by
the court in Sein, Peterson, and Lesmei'ster does provide clues to future ap-
plication. The court consistently looked to four ideas: a general concept
of fairness, scholarly articles, pre-comparative fault cases, and the UCFA
comments.
A. Fairness
Fairness is a general motivation and policy for comparative fault.' 89
In applying the statute to failure to mitigate damages the court relied
heavily on fairness. Since Lesmeister contributed to his losses, it was only
fair his recovery be diminished.190 In Peterson, diminishing Florence Pe-
terson's recovery for the defective mobile home would have been unfair
since her negligence was irrelevant to the defects.19 , Though fairness is a
wonderful policy, it alone is a thin reed of authority on which to rely.
B. Legal Scholars
For the most part, the court has used the ideas of legal scholars for
general propositions of law.192 This is partly because so little has been
written on the scope of comparative negligence and fault. Twice, how-
ever, the court has found fairly specific pieces of scholarly authority to
support its position: in Sein, 193 William Prosser's article on statutory lia-
bility and in Peterson, Joel Levine's article on warranties. 194 Scholarly
authority seems very persuasive to the court but some caution is in order.
A situation considered inappropriate for apportionment under contribu-
tory or comparative negligence may be appropriate for apportionment
under comparative fault's broader scope.
C Pre-Comparative Fault Cases
Pre-comparative fault cases are not necessarily applicable to compara-
tive fault situations but the court has relied on them. In Seim the court
made clear that because the 1978 amendment significantly broadened
the scope of the comparative negligence statute, pre-comparative fault
cases were not necessarily dispositive. 195 The court has, however, repeat-
edly looked to pre-comparative fault cases for guidance. In Seinm, the
court recognized that the 1978 amendment is consistent with comparable
negligence cases and even expands the definition of plaintiff miscon-
189. See Wade, Products Liabii'ty and Plainti.fs Fault-The Uniform Comparative Fault Act,
29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 391 (1978).
190. See Lesmetster, 330 N.W.2d at 103-04.
191. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 55.
192. See, e.g., Sebn, 306 N.W.2d at 809-10 (quotes Prof. Steenson for general proposition
that comparative fault's scope is broader than comparative negligence's).
193. See id. at 810.
194. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 54.
195. See Seim, 306 N.W.2d at 809.
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duct. 96 In Peterson, the case of Neson v. Anderson 197 suggested to the court
that non-consequential damages are not apportionable under compara-
tive fault. 198
Since the 1978 amendment expands the scope of comparative fault,199
any case applying contributory or comparative negligence should still be
good law. Comparative fault applies, then, to all traditional negligence
cases, strict liability,200 assumption of the risk, nonabsolute statutory lia-
bility, and wrongful death actions.201
Old cases not applying contributory or comparative negligence are
more difficult to deal with. Whether a particularly disfavored cause of
action is within comparative fault's scope depends on legislative intent.
The court's application of Nelson in Peterson202 was in connection with
clear legislative intent that non-consequential damages should not be ap-
portioned under comparative fault.20 3 Use of a case not applying con-
tributory or comparative fault should be accompanied by evidence of
legislative intent to also exclude the particular cause of action from com-
parative fault's scope.
Cases applying contributory or comparative negligence in a situation
can readily be used to show comparative fault's applicability to a similar
situation today. Cases not applying contributory or comparative negli-
gence, however, are not necessarily dispositive in comparative fault cases.
Combined with legislative intent not to include the previously disfavored
cause of action within comparative fault's scope, cases not applying con-
tributory or comparative negligence are strong authority. Absent such
legislative intent, old cases not applying contributory or comparative
negligence should be examined closely in connection with the other fac-
tors from Sez'm, Peterson, and Lesmezster.
D. UCFA Comments
Repeatedly the court has given great weight to the UCFA's comments.
Since the UCFA is the model for the comparative fault amendments,204
the court's reliance on the comments is not surprising. The comments
speak generally about the Act covering "physical harm to person or
property . . . includ[ing] consequential damages [but] . . . not in-
196. Id. at 810; see also Steenson, supra note 9, at 335.
197. 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955).
198. Id at 451, 72 N.W.2d at 865; see Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 53.
199. See Sein, 306 N.W.2d at 809; Steenson, supra note 9, at 335.
200. See Sebn, 306 N.W.2d at 809. See generally supra note 127 (comparative negligence
cases).
201. See generally supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
203. See Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 53-54 (comment to § I of the UNIF. COMPARATIVE
FAULT ACT indicated no intent to include contract actions).
204. See Lesmeister, 330 N.W.2d at 101; Peterson, 318 N.W.2d at 53; Semn, 306 N.W.2d at
812; see also Steenson, supra note 9, at 334.
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clud[ing] . . . economic loss."205 This is not to say, however, that "the
Act is . . . intended to preclude application of the general principle...
if a court determines that the common law of the state would make the
application." 206 The comments then go on to discuss comparative fault's
affect on a variety of specific causes of action.207
The comments leave for each state to decide whether comparative
fault includes reckless conduct. 208 In comparative negligence jurisdic-
tions, two schools of thought have developed. According to one school,
reckless conduct is conduct of a different kind from the plaintiff's negli-
gence, therefore, apportionment is impossible.209 The other school sees
reckless conduct as simply a greater degree of negligence making appor-
tionment possible.2 10 In Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co., 211 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court hinted that in a proper case, reckless conduct
might bar contributory negligence.212 Ferguson involved a plaintiff who,
while trimming trees, was electrocuted by an NSP high voltage line.213
The court did not preclude the application of comparative negligence in
the case. It noted that:
[b]ecause of the comparatively greater knowledge possessed by a utility
of the extraordinary magnitude of the risk involved in the transmission
of high-voltage electricity through residential neighborhoods, the risk
to which it subjects the ordinary city dweller is not the equivalent of
the risk the residential user subjects himself to by coming in close prox-
imity to the overhead wires. The risks are different in degree. While
we cannot hold that they are so different as to be an absolute bar to the
defense of contributory negligence, we do rule that in a case such as
this, involving a dangerous instrumentality and a great disparity in
risks, the jury, in order to fairly and accurately apportion causal negli-
gence, should be instructed to give special consideration to this
disparity.
2 14
Strict liability is apportionable according to the UCFA comments. 21 5
A host of authorities agree. 2 16 Some courts have likened the application
205. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
206. Id
207. Id.
208. Id. The comment notes that reckless conduct sometimes goes by a different name,
such as willful or wanton misconduct. Id
209. See Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979); Draney v. Bachman, 138
N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (1976).
210. See Billingsley v. Westrac Co., 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966); Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (gross negligence concept abro-
gated); Zavala v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 125 Cal. App. 3d 646, 178 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1981) (intentional conduct necessary to defeat apportionment).
211. 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976).
212. See id at 34, 239 N.W.2d at 195.
213. Id at 28, 239 N.W.2d at 191.
214. Id. at 34, 239 N.W.2d at 195 (footnote omitted).
215. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
216. See Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (Virgin Islands);
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to negligence per se. 217 A more intellectually pleasing argument posits
that strict liability at root is not really absolute but fault based. 2 18 In a
product liability situation, for example, the defendant manufacturer's
fault is producing a defective product; the plaintiff consumer's fault is
misuse, assumption of the risk, or the like. The two faults cause the in-
jury and can, therefore, be compared.2 19
Breaches of warranty are apportionable under the UCFA but there is
"no intent to include . . . actions that are fully contractual in their gra-
vamen and in which the plaintiff is suing solely because he did not re-
cover what he contracted to receive."220 The Minnesota Supreme Court
interpreted this section of the comments in Peterson. 221 Actions to recover
consequential, tort-like damages, are apportionable; actions to recover
general or incidental or other contract-like damages, are not
apportionable.
222
According to the comments intentional torts are not covered by the
Act. 2 2 3 Comparative negligence is generally rejected as a defense to in-
tentional torts.224 Under common law, contributory negligence was not
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 547 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1977) (Florida); Stueve v. Ameri-
can Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc., v.
Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Alder Wells Veterinarian Clin-
ics, Inc. v. Wood, 324 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1982); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d
377 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978);
Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81 N.J. 548, 410 A.2d 674 (1980); Suter v. San
Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Turner v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979); Carr v. Case, 135 Vt. 524, 380 A.2d 91 (1977);
Black v. General Elec. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 195, 278 N.W.2d 224 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37
Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Fischer, Products Liability- Applicability of Comparative
Negligence to Misuse and Assumption of the Risk, 43 Mo. L. REV. 643 (1978); Levine, Strict
Products Liability and Comparative Negligence.- The Collision of Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 337 (1977); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinkng Some
Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977); Comment, Comparative Negligence
and Strict Products Liabiliy, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1977). But see Melia v. Ford Motor Co.,
534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (Nebraska courts had not determined whether to apply com-
parative negligence-the court's instruction not applying comparative negligence was a
reasonable guess about how the Nebraska courts would rule); Kinard v. Coats Co., 37
Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353
(Okla. 1974); Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
217. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
218. See Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 373, 551 P.2d 398, 406, 131
Cal. Rptr. 78, 86 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting).
219. Id
220. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
221. See supra notes 156-74 and accompanying text.
222. Id
223. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § I comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
224. See Carman v. Heber, 43 Colo. App. 5, 601 P.2d 646 (1979); Stephan v. Lynch,
136 Vt. 226, 388 A.2d 376 (1978); Alsteen v. GehI, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963);
Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960); V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 19,
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a defense to an intentional tort.225 Intentional torts are punished not
because the actor failed to use reasonable care, but because the actor
intended the act. 226 The difference between the plaintiff's actions and
the defendant's actions is not one of degree but of kind. Therefore, no
basis exists for comparing the plaintiff's negligence with the defendant's
intentional act.
Nuisance actions can be based on a number of theories: intentional
tort, negligence, or strict liability. 22 7 According to the comments, the
UCFA applies to nuisance actions based on negligence or strict liability
but not to actions based on an intentional tort.2 28 This application is
consistent with the UCFA comments. 22 9 Cases have applied compara-
tive negligence to negligence based nuisance claims.230
Tort actions for violation of a statute are apportionable under the
UCFA if the conduct can be deemed "fault."231 The only exception is if
the statute was intended to impose absolute liability. 232 Minnesota fol-
lowed this logic in Sem. 233
Secondary assumption of the risk is simply a degree of fault to be com-
pared.234 Minnesota has held that comparative negligence subsumed
secondary assumption of the risk.23
5
Product misuse is apportionable, under the UCFA comments, only if
the misuse gave rise to a reasonably anticipated danger.236 This seems
225. See Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 146 Ala. 277, 41 So. 146 (1906);
Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E.2d 577 (1956);
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 65, at 426.
226. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 8, at 31.
227. Id § 87, at 574.
228. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
229. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (negligence);supra note 215 and accom-
panying text (strict liability); supra note 223 and accompanying text (intentional torts).
230. See Sandifer Motors, Inc. v. City of Roseland Park, 6 Kan. App. 308, 628 P.2d 239
(1981); Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956).
231. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1984).
232. Id
233. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
234. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1984).
Primary assumption of the risk is a different animal. In a primary assumption of the risk
situation, the defendant would not even owe a duty to the plaintiff. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, § 68, at 454-57; see also Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979)
(firemen primarily assume all expected risks but not unexpected risks).
235. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); see also Weg-
scheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1980); Bakhos v. Driver, 275 N.W.2d 594
(Minn. 1979). But see Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979) (primary
assumption of the risk not apportionable).
California also apportions assumption of the risk. See Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
236. Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394 n.16 (Minn. 1977) (adopting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) insofar as it removes fail-
ure to inspect as a defense).
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consistent with comparative negligence cases where the court stated, "a
consumer's negligent failure to inspect a product or to guard against de-
fects is not a defense [but] . . . all other types of consumer negligence,
misuse, or assumption of the risk must be compared . . . under the
statute."237
The doctrine of avoidable consequences, sometimes called last clear
chance, is expressly included in UCFA.238 Most courts have apportioned
fault in such circumstances. 239 Minnesota has not yet faced the issue but
will likely follow the comment and decisions of other courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Adoption of comparative fault was the next logical step in the expan-
sion of comparative negligence's scope. The Minnesota Supreme Court
tested the scope of comparative fault three times, in Seim, Peterson, and
Lesmeirter. Although no all-encompassing definition of comparative
fault's scope has emerged, the court's emphasis on fairness, scholarly
comment, pre-comparative fault cases, and the UCFA comments gives
an indication of the court's disposition. Clearly, comparative fault's
scope is broader than that of comparative negligence. The court will not,
however, pull all conceivable actions into a comparative fault apportion-
ment. A substantial relationship to the comparative fault statute will
have to be shown by use of fairness concepts, scholarly comment, pre-
comparative fault cases, and the UCFA comments.
237. Id
238. See UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1984).
239. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (1975),af'd, 572 P.2d 775 (Alaska 1977); Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Davies v.
Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo.
1979). But see Tiedeman v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 513 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1975)
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